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The Dialectics of Cultural Pluralism  
and Social Cohesion: 
Response to Anne Sofie Roald and Theo W.A. de Wit 
 
PETER JONKERS 
Tilburg University  
 
ABSTRACT 
Cultural (including religious) identity can be defined as a symbolic 
reality, implying that it is vague, fluid and impossible to delineate 
sharply, but at the same time essential. Although it comprises a lot of 
contingent elements, these identities cannot be completely reduced 
to contingent social constructions, since individuals, cultures, reli-
gions always stand for essential values. This implies that modern de-
mocracies not only have to respect religious pluralism, but should al-
so create a public space in which these values are discussed and thus 
mediated in order to foster social cohesion. 
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I . INTRODUCTION 
In order to introduce my comment on Anne Sofie Roald’s1 and Theo de 
Wit’s papers,2 let me start with an example. Some years ago, the Dutch crown 
                                                 
1
 Anne Sofie Roald, ‘Multiculturalism and Pluralism in Secular Society: Individual or Collective 
Rights?’, this volume. 
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princess, Maxima, who is of Argentinean origin, gave a speech, in which she 
said that, although she had been living in the Netherlands for quite some 
time, she had no idea what was exactly meant by the Dutch identity. Al-
though this remark could hardly be qualified as world-shattering, it neverthe-
less caused quite a stir, especially in royalist circles. People were convinced 
that the Dutch crown princess was downplaying what she and her husband, 
of all people, were supposed to stand for, the Dutch identity in its purity. I 
interpret this reaction as an illustration, on a on a small scale, of the identity-
crisis that not only the Dutch, but also many other Western societies are cur-
rently going through. The issue of the role of (particularly non-Christian) 
religions in the public sphere is another, more fundamental sign of this iden-
tity-crisis. More in general this crisis is a consequence of the well-known 
processes of individualization and secularization that have taken place since 
the sixties of the 20th century, the devolution of a lot of national legislative 
power to a supra-national level, but above all the rise of cultural and religious 
pluralism since the end of last century. They have caused the loss of plausibil-
ity of a lot of traditional political and social structures and points of reference 
that used to give cohesion and orientation to society.  
In my comment on the above-mentioned papers I will focus on a ques-
tion, which is underlying many of the current debates about multiculturalism 
and religious pluralism in secular societies: How are modern societies, whose 
essential plural nature urges them to accept the growing religious diversity in 
some way or another, at the same time able to uphold social cohesion, which 
is crucial for their identity? The ‘how’ of my question is not to be understood 
as an empirical examination of how various societies are de facto dealing with 
this question, but stands for a philosophical investigation into some of its 
preconditions. First I shall discuss the problem of cultural identity, and in the 




II. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY AND THE DIALECTICS OF PURITY AND IMPURITY 
Just as is the case with personal identity, the identity of a society or reli-
gious community is easy to discern but at the same time very hard to deter-
mine unambiguously. Taking up again the above example it is clear that the 
identity of Dutch society resembles the English, French or German ones in 
                                                                                                                                         
2
 Theo W.A. de Wit, ‘After Multiculturalism: Response to Anne Sofie Roald,’ this volume. 
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many respects, but also differs from them, e.g. through its language, tradi-
tions, political system, history, size etc. But if one wants to delineate this 
identity precisely and unambiguously, it is hard to come any further than the 
well-known stereotypes. Furthermore, national characteristics may apply to 
some citizens but not to others, or in various degrees, they are not at all uni-
quely Dutch etc. The same holds true with religious identities: many people 
call themselves Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim by birth and still feel 
some affinity with these creeds, but do not identify themselves as devout 
faithful, and surely do not follow all the moral and religious guidelines of the 
religious community they belong to. This is what Anne Sophie Roald calls the 
inevitable impurity of (religious) identities, of which she gives some examples 
in the Islam world, especially regarding the position of women.3 
The complex issue of social and religious identities deserves to be ex-
amined further, since it forms the backbone of the discussion about multicul-
turalism, as developed in the two papers I comment on. From a sociological 
perspective multiculturalism refers to the reality of a considerable cultural 
and religious diversity in a given society. Particularly Western societies, 
which have been confronted with a dramatic increase of this diversity during 
the last decades, face the need of developing new strategies to deal with this 
reality. One of these strategies is political multiculturalism, which can be de-
fined as the policy to allow or even actively promote cultural (including reli-
gious) diversity by attributing special individual or collective-rights to specif-
ic cultures. The most extreme forms of such a (strong) multiculturalist policy, 
of which Roald’s paper offers various examples, are legal pluralism and the 
acceptance of new official languages besides the already existing one(s).4 At 
the other end of this spectrum we find the policy of cultural and/or religious 
homogenization or ethnocentrism. Although these two policies seem to be 
diametrically opposed to each other, the arguments in favor of strong multi-
culturalism can easily turn into a defense of ethnocentrism, namely when the 
cultural majority claims collective rights for its own.5 
This and other paradoxes regarding the policies to deal with the growing 
impact of multiculturalism in most Western societies make clear that this 
question deserves to be discussed on a philosophical level, notwithstanding 
the fact that a lot of reasonable, pragmatic answers to this issue have already 
been given and successfully implemented. In this paper I want to focus on 
                                                 
3
 Roald, ‘Multiculturalism and Pluralism,’ section I. 
4
 Roald, ‘Multiculturalism and Pluralism,’ section I. 
5
 De Wit, ‘After Multiculturalism,’ section I. 
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religious diversity and the place of religions in the public space especially 
because of the enormous motivational potential religions have always had 
upon people, both positively and negatively. In contemporary, continental 
philosophy, the identity of a nation or religion is often defined as a symbolic 
reality: certain material things, words, gestures and practices get a special 
meaning, because they refer symbolically to what a national or religious iden-
tity stands for. The flag of a country or the national anthem are treated with 
far more respect than an ordinary piece of cloth or any other song, because 
they symbolize the nation and thus give it a symbolic identity; the Bible, the 
Torah or the Quran are treated with more reverence than ordinary books 
because they have a symbolic meaning as the Word of God or the Prophet, 
and thus are crucial for the identity of the religious community.6 Taken to-
gether they constitute a symbolic system, such as a nation or a religious de-
nomination. Although the relation between the material things or practices 
and what they stand for symbolically is rather vague, fluid, and sometimes 
even arbitrary, people nevertheless identify themselves with these symbols, 
although, again, there is a great variety within a community as to the symbols 
they identify with as well as to the degree of their identification. A concrete 
example of this is the color orange to symbolize the Dutch national identity. 
The color refers symbolically to the House of Orange, although the colors of 
the national flag (red, white and blue) could also have been chosen as the 
color of identification. Moreover, in spite of the fact that the Netherlands is a 
very individualized country, over the years more and more people have 
started to wear orange tee-shirts, decorate their houses with orange ribbons 
and even paint their houses orange when the national football-team takes 
part in the European or World championships. This shows that the rather 
vague and fluid nature of symbols to express one’s identity does not mean at 
all that these identities would be fluid and arbitrary as well, so that they 
could merge into a general cosmopolitan identity, as Julia Kristeva suggests.7 
On the contrary, although there are many similarities in the symbolic expres-
sions of Catholicism and Protestantism, and although both creeds have a lot 
in common, this does not mean that  people would be willing to give up their 
Catholic or Protestant identity, nor would they be willing to give up the sym-
bols as expressing it. In sum, symbols are the expression of a specific national 
or religious identity (they cannot be mixed up with other ones), but they are 
                                                 
6
 A. Burms, ‘Het eigene: reëel en symbolisch’, in R. Breeur and A. Burms, Ik / Zelf. Essays over 
Identiteit en Zelfbewustzijn (Leuven: Peeters 2000), p. 126f. 
7
 Julia Kristeva, Etrangers à nous-mêmes (Paris: Fayard 1988). 
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also vague and fluid, so that they cannot be pinpointed unambiguously, once 
and for all and applicable to all people sharing this identity; in other words 
there is no one to one relation between these symbols and the identity they 
stand for. 
However, especially when people find themselves in a situation of dias-
pora or when they have the impression that traditional symbols of their cul-
tural and/or religious identity are jeopardized, then they often react to this 
by reifying and solidifying their identity by taking these symbols as some-
thing absolute. People then cling to material things, words, gestures and 
practices, so that they lose their symbolic character, and start to serve as the 
actual essence of their identity, requiring strict observance by all members of 
a community. This inevitably starts off a process of homogenization, often in 
combination with segregation, in which one’s identity is reduced to a kind of 
objective checklist, which can be ticked off after having completed a natura-
lization-course: in order to count as a Dutchman or an Englishman, you have 
to speak the language of the country, you have to know the political and legal 
structure of the country, you have to be familiar with a lot of informal dos 
and don’ts etc.; in order to count as a female Muslim you have to wear a veil 
and subordinate yourself to male ruling; in order to count as a Catholic you 
have to obey the Pope uncritically in every respect etc. If this happens, (reli-
gious) identity is reduced to a limited number of univocal qualifications, 
which no longer symbolize this identity, but incarnate it in the strong sense 
of the word. Philosophically speaking this comes down to a relapse of the 
symbolic into the imaginary, a solidification and homogenization of a fluid 
and multi-layered symbolic reality. Anne Sophie Roald gives a number of ex-
amples of this mechanism in connection with certain Muslim communities 
acting as a group and exercising a clear group pressure upon their members. 
She defines this mechanism as a purification of the impure.8 However, as 
Theo de Wit’s example at the end of his paper clearly shows, this propensity 
to purification is by no means the prerogative of Islamic or other traditional 
communities, but also happens in secularist circles.9 We can see examples of 
such a secularist purification of cultural identity quite often in today’s public 
debate. It comes down to the following: in order to be accepted as a full 
member of secular, Western society, you have to be secular, individualist, to-
lerant to homosexuals etc. But what about Christian communities in modern 
societies, who definitely refuse to adapt their political arguments to the cur-
                                                 
8
 Roald, ‘Multiculturalism and Pluralism,’ section II. 
9
 De Wit, ‘After Multiculturalism,’ section III. 
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rent secular newspeak, who value strong communities, who claim the right to 
dislike homosexuals etc.? Are their strong, traditional convictions to be re-
garded as impurities that need to be cleansed in order to comply with a puri-
fied image of Western Modernity? Hence, as De Wit points out correctly, 
Roald’s disqualification, from a feminist perspective, of Islamic women wear-
ing a veil as per se a sign of oppression by the male members of their creed is 
itself an example of purification or solidification, since wearing a veil can as 
well be interpreted as a free-chosen, symbolic expression of the religious 
identity of traditional Islamic women in a secularized world.10 
Although often motivated by the most laudable intentions, a (strong) 
multiculturalist policy to attribute collective rights to certain groups, serious-
ly boosts the mechanism of imaginary identification, of solidification what is 
fluid and of purifying the impure. The right of certain cultural, ethnic or reli-
gious groups to differ from others, including from main-stream culture, often 
leads to cultural insulation and opposition, as well as to a oppression of 
people who refuse to live up to this image. If the so-called politics of (the rec-
ognition of) differences does not refer to substantial values, but only to the 
abstract right to differ from others, people run the risk of being forced to 
identify themselves with a solidified or reified image of the culture or reli-
gious community to which they belong. Then the differences between cul-
tures and/or religions are highlighted, their similarities are systematically 
downplayed, and cultural identity is presented as completely homogeneous, 
so to say a package deal, from which no (partial) escape is possible. The rea-
son why a symbolic identity so easily relapses into an imaginary one is that it 
is so reassuring, since it arranges things neatly, and enables people to unam-
biguously distinguish the good guys from the bad ones. One has only to refer 
to the growing success of populist parties in most West-European countries 
or to fundamentalist religious movements in order to realize how popular 
this strategy is. As we all know too well, placing the other outside us is at first 
sight very effective to realize a very strong sense of social or religious cohe-
sion, but eventually poisons the political discussion on what holds our plural 
society together. This is not to say that a state should abolish all collective 
rights, I merely want to make clear that multiculturalism as a policy should 
not be founded on the abstract right to be different, but on essential human, 
cultural or religious values for which there is but little room or attention in 
main-stream society. 
                                                 
10
 De Wit, ‘After Multiculturalism,’ section II. 
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The result of my discussion of multiculturalism and (religious) identity 
is paradoxical: in our times, which are often defined as reflective modernity, 
we are unexpectedly confronted with a relapse into a kind of irreflexivity or 
immediacy. To phrase it more concretely: in a multicultural society and espe-
cially as a result of multiculturalist policy people take a highly reflective 
stance with regard to their own cultural or religious identity. But if this self-
reflexivity lacks substance, in other words if it is not oriented by an aware-
ness of the essential values that their culture tries to substantiate, and a ge-
nuine interest in the ways other cultures are trying to substantiate the same 
or other essential values, then the inevitable outcome is an attitude of irony, 
of empty tolerance, as De Wit calls it: people are convinced that all cultures 
are but contingent social constructions, and need to be tolerated regardless 
of their substance.11 However, as Rorty has shown, the ironist is a pathological 
figure, since people simply need points of reference in order to lead their 
lives, although they lack any substantial meaning because of their contingen-
cy.12 Because the multicultural society in which we live lacks substance, a ref-
lection about what makes our or other’s culture or religion worthwhile breaks 
down on the incommensurability of (religious or cultural) discourses, so that 
the only remaining option for society is to relapse in a kind of ethnocentrism, 
i.e. the gut feeling that there are limits to what one can take seriously, being a 
clear example of irreflexivity.13 
 
 
III. THE COMPLEX RELATION OF (RELIGIOUS) PLURALISM WITH SOCIAL COHESION 
The discussion of the previous section about the complexities of (reli-
gious) identity has left us only with negative answers to the question of the 
relation between multiculturalism and identity, of cultural pluralism and so-
cial cohesion. On the one hand, a policy of active multiculturalism, under the 
heading ‘let many flowers blossom’ (De Wit), is no option, since it negates 
the basic fact that identity, on a personal as well as on a cultural and religious 
level, is a symbolic reality, implying that, as symbolic, it is fluid, vague and 
impossible to delineate sharply, but as a reality it nevertheless is fundamental 
                                                 
11
 De Wit, ‘After Multiculturalism,’ section I. 
12
 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991), 
p. 203. 
13
 I developed this point further in: Peter Jonkers, ‘Contingent Religions, Contingent Truths?’ in 
Religions Challenged by Contingency. Theological and Philosophical Perspectives to the Problem of Con-
tingency, Dirk-Martin Grube and Peter Jonkers (eds.), (Leiden: Brill 2008), 161-181. 
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for who we are. On the other hand, a policy of active homogenization, in 
combination with cultural and/or religious segregation (the most extreme 
example of which is ethnic cleansing) is no option either, since it results in a 
relapse into an imaginary identification, which only accentuates the differ-
ences between people and eventually causes hatred and oppression. 
In the remainder of this paper I want to offer some positive answers to 
the question under discussion. I shall thereby use some insights of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right on the relation between religion and politics and apply 
them to the current debate. Hegel’s position comes down to a recognition of 
the necessity of a separation between state and church in order to realize a 
basic principle of modernity, viz. religious pluralism, but simultaneously a 
clear view of the need for a unity between religion and politics in order to 
uphold social cohesion.14 
The fundamental reason for the modern state to accept the separation 
between state and Church as its basic principle and hence to recognize reli-
gious pluralism is a direct consequence of the fact that it treats humans as 
‘persons’, and that personhood includes a public and thus legal dimension. In 
the context of a discussion about freedom of religion Hegel says that being 
human ‘is not just a neutral and abstract quality,’ but lies in ‘the self-
awareness as recognized legal persons in civil society.’15 People get this feeling 
through their free self-determination, including the freedom to choose their 
creed, and the recognition of this choice by the state. Even if some elements 
of this creed are at odds with the principles of the state, Hegel thinks it better 
for the state to refrain from intervening in religious affairs and leave it to in-
ternal reasonableness of civil society and its more subtle means of persua-
sion, like public debate, social pressure etc. Applied to the Roald’s position 
on the freedom of Islamic women to wear a veil, this means that if the state 
wants to protect these women from oppression by their own religious com-
munity by banning the wearing of the veil altogether, the remedy risks to be 
worse than the disease.16 Imposing politically correct clothing, behavior or 
                                                 
14
 For an excellent historical overview of (the development of) Hegel’s position in this respect cfr. 
Walter Jaeschke, ‘Es ist ein Begriff der Freiheit in Religion und Staat,’ in Staat und Religion in Hegels 
Rechtsphilosophie, Andreas Arndt, Christian Iber and Günther Kruck (eds.), (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 
2009),  p. 9ff.  I developed my position about this issue further in: Peter Jonkers, ‘Das gespannte Ver-
hältnis zwischen Religion und Politik in der Modernität: Versuch einer Aktualisierung der hegelschen 
Rechtsphilosophie,‘ in Hegel-Jahrbuch, Andreas Arndt (ed.), (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, forthcoming). 
15
 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Allen W. Wood (ed.), H. 
B. Nisbet (transl.), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991), § 270fn. 
16
 Roald, ‘Multiculturalism and Pluralism,’ section IV. 
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opinions or forcing religious communities to accept people with heterodox 
opinions or deviant behavior or styles of clothing as their members, is not 
only completely ineffective, but is also patronizing because it affects the self-
awareness of the citizens to count as legal persons. In particular, the state 
thereby is suggestive of ignoring the right of citizens to choose freely their 
religious affiliation. If the state acts in this way, it paradoxically negates, un-
der the guise of protecting their liberty, the freedom of humans and thus re-
duces being human to an abstract quality. As Rawls rightly states: ‘The prin-
ciples of political justice do not apply to the internal life of a church, nor is it 
desirable, or consistent with liberty of conscience or freedom of association, 
that they should.’17 
Although the separation between state and Church is a basic principle of 
modern society, the state also has uphold social cohesion. Consequently it 
has to intervene if the ideas or practices of religious communities threat vital 
values of society. To take up the Roald’s example of the wearing of the veil 
again, this means that the state has to protect the right of persons to step out 
of a cultural or religious community. Hence, state-intervention should not be 
motivated by religious reasons, but by its obligation to protect religious free-
dom, in this case the flipside of it, viz. the freedom to be without a specific 
(religious) culture (Roald). In relation to the role of the state in upholding 
social cohesion Hegel offers an interesting explanation of the fact that some 
religions take a hostile attitude towards the state. As the work of Kymlicka 
and other influential liberal political thinkers show,18 the liberal state is ra-
ther reluctant to explicitly define the common good, leaving it to a large ex-
tent up to the individuals to decide how they want to give shape to their 
lives. But according to Hegel the consequence of such a liberal attitude is that 
‘the higher spiritual element of what is true in and for itself is placed, as sub-
jective religiosity […] beyond the confines of the state which […] is thus com-
pletely deprived of its proper ethical character.’19 So, if the state is unable or 
unwilling to represent and defend the common good explicitly, it leaves the 
door wide open to religious or secular individuals or groups to fill up this gap 
with their own ideas. Of course, in a plural society individual citizens and 
religious (and secular) communities have the basic right to put forward all 
kinds of opinions about the common good. But the duty of the state is to bal-
                                                 
17
 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,’ in John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1999) 158. 
18
 Cfr. Roald, ‘Multiculturalism and Pluralism,’ section I. 
19
 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 270. 
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ance these opinions with those of others, to relate them to fundamental prin-
ciples of justice and well-being etc. This implies that in a multicultural socie-
ty the state has to supplement its attitude of passive neutrality by a policy of 
active neutralization in order to safeguard social cohesion. This means that 
the state should create a platform and a form, in which our diverging sub-
stantial attachments become visible and can be discussed in a mediated way. 
According to Rawls this is an essential element of deliberative democracy, 
and it concretely is provided by the media, educational institutions, and cul-
tural and religious groups including churches, which contribute to fostering 
the relevant encounter.20 We then no longer completely coincide with our 
religious or cultural identities, but only represent them, so that we can reflect 
upon them. By creating such a representative form the state is able to neu-
tralize our immediate gut feelings and thus to protect us against our own in-
dividual or collective egotisms, be the Christian, Islamic or secular. 
                                                 
20
 Rawls, ‘The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,’ p. 139; and Patrick Riordan, ‘Permission to Speak: 
Religious Arguments in Public Reason,’ in Heythrop Journal 45 (2004), 178-196, p. 184. 
